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John Holmes and Colin Leys
The articles published in this issue are a selection - in
a considerably shortened form - of the papers
presented to a workshop held at Queen's University,
Kingston, in May 1984, on the theme of 'Development
in the 1980s: Canada in the Western Hemisphere'. The
workshop was organised by the Queen's Programme
of Studies in National and International Development,
and it aimed to explore the implications of the current
restructuring of the world economy for development
in the Americas.*
In development studies it is widely agreed that analysis
should proceed simultaneously at the international
and the national (or regional) levels, but practice
rarely lives up to principle. In this instance, a
determined effort was made by starting out from the
analysis of the global crisis by Lipietz, and going on to
focus on three aspects of the response to the crisis:
1) 'de-industrialisation' in the USA and Canada, and
its social and political consequences (represented here
by articles by Niosi, Faucher and Gagnon and
Montcalm); 2) the impact of the crisis on US policy in
Central America and the Caribbean (the article by
Petras and Morley); and 3) the consequences and
implications for socialist movements in that region
(articles by Thomas, Adkin and Hyett and Fairley and
Ramnarine).
A further aim was to try to examine development in
Canada and the less developed regions of the
hemisphere through the same lens. Canada is widely
(and not unreasonably) referred to as an 'affluent
dependency', and there is a substantial theoretical and
empirical literature on it.' The workshop sought to
extend this perspective by including explicit com-
parisons of Canadian and Caribbean experience; an
* The workshop was made possible by a grant from the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. We
are also grateful to Cynthia Guttman and Tod Rutherford for
editorial assistance, to Guy Beaulieu for translation and to
Bernice Gallagher, Daphne Jenkins and Usha Thakur for
typing.
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aim exemplified by the contribution of Fairley and
Ramnarine.
The world economy is clearly in the midst of a period
of major restructuring which is having profound
effects on both developed and developing countries in
every region of the world. The manufacturing sectors
in virtually all of the OECD countries display the same
symptoms: a drastic slowdown in productivity
growth, declining industrial employment, stagnating
industrial output and sharply rising unit labour costs.
During the last ten years falling realised profit rates,
coupled with intensified international competition,
have forced many industrial sectors and individual
firms to undertake large-scale restructuring and
reorganisation of production. At the same time the
state in the advanced economies has come under
intense pressure to reduce the levels of public sector
borrowing and expenditure, and the NICs, which were
experiencing rapid economic growth, are faced with
debt crises and heightening internal political tensions.
The scale and nature of this restructuring of the world
economy is qualitatively different from the processes
of restructuring associated with normal business
cycles. A growing number of writers suggest that the
world economy is going through the third 'long swing'
crisis of the past hundred years and that the
restructuring that is currently underway is an attempt
to find a 'solution' to this crisis which, if found, will
mark the emergence of a new and qualitatively
different phase in the history of capitalist development.
Although these writers differ in the detail of their
analyses they agree on:
- the approximate timing of the onset of the crisis-
the late 1960s;
For references to the most recent developments in this literature see
various issues of the journal Studies in Political Economy, especially
no 6 (Autumn 1981), special issue on 'Rethinking Canadian
Political Economy',
- the need to situate the crisis in the broader
historical context of the development and subsequent
exhaustion of the long post-war economic boom;
- the fact that this period of restructuring
represents a major rupture within the history of
capitalist development.
In seeking to provide an overall framework for the
themes to be explored in the workshop we chose to
focus on the writing of the French regulation school.
We found their interpretation of the post-war period
in terms of the development and subsequent crisis of
the 'intensive regime of accumulation', more com-
monly known as Fordism, attractive for a number of
reasons. First, their key analytical concepts of 'regime
of accumulation' and 'mode of regulation' stress the
crucial links between production and consumption,
and draw attention to the fact that, during periods of
major rupture such as this, restructuring is not limited
to the transformation of the organisation of
production but also encompasses the transformation
of consumption norms and a whole range of
economic, social and political institutional forms.
Secondly, their account includes the linkages between
different aspects of the crisis which are manifested at
both the international and national scale, and which
are often dealt with separately elsewhere in the
literature. For example, the analysis presented in
Alain Lipietz's article ties together the economic
restructuring effects of the crisis which are being
experienced in the advanced industrial economies of
North America and Western Europe, the economic
development and the subsequent debt crises and
internal political conflicts which have characterised
the recent history of the NICs, and the political and
military consequences of the erosion of US economic
and political hegemony.
Lipietz argues that the long post-war boom in North
America and Western Europe was due to a
combination of the progressive extension and
generalisation of 'Fordist' techniques of production to
many sectors of consumption goods production, with
the continued expansion of mass consumption and a
sharp rise in standards of living. He emphasises two
points: first the crucial significance of rising rates of
productivity and the link between the latter and the
growth in real wages; secondly, the fact that Fordism
was to a very large extent developed as a regime of
accumulation whose mode of regulation was internal
to the national economies of the advanced capitalist
societies, and that analogous regulatory mechanisms
and institutions did not develop to regulate the
interaction between these national economies at the
international level. The onset of the crisis in the late
1960s resulted from the breakdown of this system of
regulation. Two factors in particular are crucial to
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understanding the crisis that developed within
Fordism; the slowdown in productivity growth and
the intensification of international comptition.
Lipietz suggests that the slowdown in productivity
growth resulted from the failure of Fordist principles
of labour organisation as workers resisted the further
intensification of production. Other writers have
ascribed the slowdown in productivity growth to other
causes. However, irrespective of what led to this
slowdown, there is no disputing the fact that in North
America it was dramatic and that it resulted in a rapid
escalation in unit labour costs and a crisis of
profitability. The intensification of international
competition resulted in large measure from the very
success of Fordism within the advanced industrial
economies. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s the
rapid growth in domestic output in the consumption
goods sectors was generally absorbed by growing
internal domestic markets. However, this tendency
toward ever expanded production, which in turn
required ever larger and wider markets, spilled over
national boundaries, and competition among the
OECD economies for each others' markets intensified.
The existence of surplus capacity on a world scale, and
of substantial variations in unit costs of production
between different national producers, also reduced the
profitability of production in countries such as the
USA and Canada which had the higher unit costs of
production.
The slowdown in productivity growth and the
intensification of international competition in the
1970s (both manifested in declining profitability)
forced the wholesale restructuring of large segments of
the OECD economies and led ultimately to the
monetarist deflation which brought on the globàl
recession.
Restructuring and industrial change is clearly a two-
sided (though not necessarily a zero sum) process in
that it brings into being new plants, production
methods and jobs while displacing older ones. During
the current period of restructuring many industrial
sectors and regions of North America have
experienced the displacement effects of restructuring
- disinvestment and rationalisation, plant closings,
high rates of job loss and unemployment and the
consequent economic and social dislocation of
communities. 'De-industrialisation' is now part of the
standard lexicon of contemporary economic discourse
on both sides of the Atlantic and is often used as a kind
of shorthand label to describe and 'explain'
simultaneously the phenomena described above. The
articles by Jorge Niosi and Philippe Faucher provide
data to document the form taken by de-industriali-
sation in the US and Canada respectively.
We felt that it was particularly important to include
these articles since, with the much-heralded recent
recovery in the US economy (a recovery that
increasingly looks as though it will be short lived), it is
easy to lose sight of the changes which occurred in the
North American economy during the 1970s; changes
which have contributed significantly to the decline in
US hegemony.
Both authors note that whilst manufacturing in North
America has declined in relative economic importance
since the late 1960s, there has not been the massive
absolute loss of manufacturing employment which has
been the most worrying and specific feature of de-
industrialisation in the UK. In fact, it is worth
mentioning that during the 1970s jobs were created in
the US at twice the rate of the previous three decades.
However, there has been a shift from more highly paid
full-time male employment in manufacturing to lower
paid part-time female and youth employment in the
service sector, and there is mounting evidence in North
America that a polarisation into a bimodal
distribution of household income is emerging - the
so-called 'missing middle' phenomenon. Niosi also
documents the decline of the commercial and financial
sectors of the US economy relative to the world
economy as a whole and Faucher highlights the
weakness of the Canadian industrial sector.2
Both authors also discuss current and possible future
industrial policy responses to industrial decline in
North America. This highlights the issues raised by
Lipietz in his discussion of possible escape routes from
the crisis. Although there is evidence to suggest that
fairly large gains in labour productivity are possible
through the implementation of new microelectronic-
based process technologies, simply transforming the
techniques of production does not constitute the
formation of a new mode of regulation. The question
of how to match consumption with the increase in
output that greater labour productivity will bring
remains to be solved. This point is underscored by the
contradictions that are implicit in the idea of 're-
industrialisation' which is currently so popular in the
US and which is advocated in various forms by
analysts of many different political stripes. Re-
industrialisation appears to offer something for
everyone by implying that a sharp upturn in
employment and output is possible if only the right
'industrial policy mix' can be found. The proponents
In comparison with other OECD countries. Canada has a strikingly
different economic structure which is reflected in employment,
output and trade figures and which is a result of the 'peculiar'
position of Canada within current and past international divisions
of labour. Today, Canada supplies raw materials and semi-finished
products to other industrialised OECD economies, produces
consumption goods for a limited (in absolute size rather than
individual consumption norms) but affluent domestic market, and
imports both consumption goods and extreniely large volumes of
capital goods.
of re-industrialisation strategies all emphasise the
need to increase labour productivity but, as Block has
noted, '. . . as long as employers continue to have
strong incentives to produce goods more cheaply, it
seems highly unlikely that any programme of "re-
industrialisation" will increase manufacturing person
hours. The choice of particular policies - protection
of older industries vs support for high technology
firms - is likely to influence only the rate at which
manufacturing employment declines' [Block 1984:69].
As Lipietz suggests, one possibility is that any new
mode of regulation that emerges must include a new
'functional form' - other than the wage as we now
know it - for apportioning the social product, or a
dramatic decrease in individual work time with no loss
of real wages. Of course, there are also other scenarios
(only hinted at by Lipietz) which are extremely grim.
At present, however, such long-term implications of
the crisis for North America are apt to be obscured by
its immediate effects on longstanding social and
political issues. In Canada this means, above all, the
chronically vexed issue of regionalism, and notably
that of Quebec. The article by Alain Gagnon and
Mary Beth Montcalm examines the contemporary
realignment of class and political relations within
Quebec in the context of the economic restructuring of
both the North American and world economies. They
note that the relative decline of the Quebec economy,
which is still based heavily on primary resource
industries and older industrial sectors such as textiles,
and the increasing economic peripheralisation ofQuebec within both the Canadian and North
American economies, are not of recent origin.
However, the effects of this decline were masked in the
l960s and 1970s by the rapid expansion of the state
sector which saw the rise of a new middle class. The
latter was an important element in the political
alliance which first returned the nationalist Parti
québécois (PQ) to power. However, in the face of the
deepening economic crisis, the PQ government has
been forced to reduce government borrowing and
spending and this has led to a widening gap between
the interests of the new middle class and those of the
PQ. Gagnon and Montcalm go on to explore other
elements in the major realignment of the Quebec
power structure which is occurring in the context of
shifting class alliances which, in turn, are a response to
the global crisis and Quebec's peripheral position
within the world economy.
For the rest of the Americas, and the countries of the
Caribbean, the most important immediate effect of the
crisis has, of course, been the 'seismic shift' in the
political balance in Washington and Ottawa.
Economic contraction, manifested in declining
regions, and (for significant segments of the
population) in stagnant or declining real incomes, has
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undermined the broad political consensus that
formerly sustained the parties primarily identified
with the post-war 'settlement' - the Democrats in the
USA and the Liberals in Canada. The Republicans
finally displaced the Democrats in the watershed
election of 1980; the Conservatives finally displaced
the Liberals in the equally decisive Canadian election
of 1984. In the US case, economic weakness was
mirrored in loss of international power. Failure in
Vietnam and the humiliation of the Teheran hostages
incident led directly to popular support for Mr
Reagan's belligerent 'new patriotism'; and the
invasion of Grenada was widely perceived (and
approved) as a reassertion of the USA's proper
international authority. The invasion also fitted into
the President's Caribbean Basin Initiative, announced
early in 1982: a package of bilateral military and
economic measures designed to link the Caribbean
and Central American countries (but excluding Cuba,
Grenada and Nicaragua) more closely to US markets,
and to foster economic growth based on the private
sector.
As James Petras and Morris Morley show, these
measures were, in essence, less novel than they may
have appeared; they were in line with traditional US
policies in the region, regardless of the party in office.
On the other hand Petras and Morley also examine the
tension that exists between US military and economic
interests, and the corresponding tension between US
military interests and Canadian economic interests in
the region - at least while the Liberals remained in
office in Ottawa between 1980 and 1984. They also
indicate, however, the way in which Canadian
interests have always been subordinated to those of
the USA, owing to Canada's own economic and
military dependence on the United States.
The articles by Thomas, and by Adkin and Hyett
examine the impact of the crisis on the Caribbean and
on Chile. The Caribbean has always been a sensitive
barometer of global economic and political pressures
as a few examples readily show.
The experience of Jamaica, the largest of the English-
speaking Caribbean countries, is relatively well
known. Michael Manley's Peoples National Party
government, elected in 1972, 'turned to the left' in 1974
in face of the deepening world economic crisis and the
opposition of the multinational companies which
controlled the country's most critical export sector
- bauxite. After being re-elected in 1976 on the basis
of its more radical programme, however, the PNP
government gradually succumbed to a mounting fiscal
crisis, mounting unemployment and mounting
violence organised by the opposition, and was
eventually heavily defeated by Edward Seaga's right-
wing Jamaica Labour Party in the elections, of October
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1980; a result greeted with enthusiasm by the incoming
Reagan administration in Washington following the
US elections in November of the same year. In
Guyana, by contrast, the left, represented mainly by
Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party, had been
in opposition since it was, in effect, removed from
office a second time by British intervention in 1963.
Consequently, the governing People's National
Congress (PNC) of Forbes Burnham continued to
receive US support in spite of its adoption in 1970 of a
strategy of 'cooperative socialism'. However, as the
article by Bryant Fairley and Devanand Ramnarine
shows, the PNC's 'socialism' was very ambiguous; and
by 1981 the whole economy had become virtually
insolvent, while the democratic process had been
effectively suspended.
In Grenada, the rhythm of the crisis was different
again. Following independence in 1974 the regime of
Eric Gairy presided over economic decline, combined
with gross corruption, which in combination with the
world economic recession eventually led to the
virtually bloodless coup by 40 'combatants' of the
opposition New Jewel Movement (NJM) in March
1979. With Cuban help the NJM regime immediately
embarked on a programme of radical economic
development, and by the end of 1982 seemed to be
achieving a large measure of success, as well as
mobilising wide popular support. The regime came
under considerable diplomatic and economic pressure
from the Reagan administration from 1981 onwards
(signalled by Grenada's exclusion from the 1982
Caribbean Basin Initiative) and this may well have
contributed to its eventual collapse. But while the
NJM revolution was partly a result of the world-wide
crisis, its final self-destruction through the murder of
Maurice Bishop and many of his closest colleagues
cannot be explained primarily by external causes. The
collapse of the Grenadian experiment was thus all the
more traumatic for those who dreamed of an
alternative to the dependent and unpromising forms
of development so far experienced in the Caribbean.
Why, then, did the Grenadian revolution 'implode' (to
use Thomas's apt word)? And what are the likely
long-run effects on the region as a whole? In a
remarkably candid review Clive Thomas, one of the
region's foremost intellectuals, argues that the cause
was a fatal insensitivity to the content and forms of
pluralist democracy, which are central to the region's
hard-won political heritage; and that the consequences
are even more profound than the new opening given
by the crisis to the assertion of American regional
dominance, important though that is in itself.
In considering the significance of the Grenadian crisis
of October 1983 the lessons of Chile's socialist
experiment (terminated by the murder of Allende
almost exactly 10 years earlier) are of considerable
interest. Given the severity of the repression after
1973, the Chilean left has shown remarkable
resilience. Laurie Adkin and Catherine Hyett examine
the recent thinking of the Chilean left about a
democratic transition to socialism, and the 'con-
vergence' that has occurred, both among the left, and
between them and their Christian-Democratic and
other allies, in the movement for a return to
democracy. What is critical in all such situations, they
argue, is the degree of 'hegemony' achieved by the
parties of the left both in popular organisations of all
kinds, and in parts of the state machinery.
The final article, by Bryant Fairley and Devanand
Ramnarine, takes up the general issue of alliances
between popular and middle class interests by
considering the question of 'populism' as socialist
strategy. Populism of various kinds is perhaps the
commonest of all Third World approaches to
development, and the world-wide restructuring of
capital is likely to lead to its resurgence. This makes
the analysis of populism a basic task for students of
development and policy-makers. Also of note in the
case studies presented in this article is that one is
drawn from an 'underdeveloped' province of Canada,
the other from the Caribbean; but both are analysed in
the same way. In each case, the authors argue, a
'populist' programme conceals a project of small-scale
capital. The conclusion may be controversial: the
article stands as a challenge to others to provide an
equally clear and consistent alternative framework, so
that the realities and not the rhetoric of the
underdeveloped world's 'populisms' become the
proper subject of enquiry and policy.
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